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By Joshua Snoke, Timothy R. Brick, Aleksandra Slavkovic´ and Michael D.
Hunter
Pennsylvania State University and University of Oklahoma Health Sciences Center
This paper focuses on the privacy paradigm of providing access to
researchers to remotely carry out analyses on sensitive data stored be-
hind firewalls. We address the situation where the analysis demands
data from multiple physically separate databases which cannot be
combined. Motivating this problem are analyses using multiple data
sources that currently are only possible through extension work creat-
ing a trusted user network. We develop and demonstrate a method for
accurate calculation of the multivariate normal likelihood equation,
for a set of parameters given the partitioned data, which can then be
maximized to obtain estimates. These estimates are achieved without
sharing any data or any true intermediate statistics of the data across
firewalls. We show that under a certain set of assumptions our method
for estimation across these partitions achieves identical results as es-
timation with the full data. Privacy is maintained by adding noise
at each partition. This ensures each party receives noisy statistics,
such that the noise cannot be removed until the last step to obtain
a single value, the true total log-likelihood. Potential applications in-
clude all methods utilizing parameter estimation through maximizing
the multivariate normal likelihood equation. We give detailed algo-
rithms, along with available software, and both a real data example
and simulations estimating structural equation models (SEMs) with
partitioned data.
1. Introduction. In many real-life settings, researchers wish to utilize data from sep-
arate databases but are unable to physically combine the data due to restrictions such as
privacy concerns, proprietary issues, sheer size of the data, or massively distributed data
such as proposed by Boker et al. (2015). Consider situations such as in health where a
researcher wishing to carry out a longitudinal study on PTSD for veterans who utilize
different hospitals and primary care physicians, in education with students switching be-
tween schools, or in behavioral psychology with a twin study where the twins do not wish to
share their data with each other. In all these cases, standard practice is to go through user
agreements or develop trusted data centers which are allowed to pool data, both of which
take lengthy periods of time. Sometimes it is not even possible to establish such a trusted
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party. Alternatively, estimates may be obtained through algorithms that pool information
across the databases to produce combined statistics or estimate models without sharing
the data. When privacy is a concern, doing this “securely” implies two elements: first that
the private inputs, the data, from each database are not shared or revealed and second
that the estimates produced are accurate to what would be produced if all the data were
combined. While guaranteeing the data are not shared, different algorithms can provide
different levels of security based on the potential for data leakage through the sharing of
intermediate values.
Motivating this work is a real model based on research data that came from multiple
sources and could only be combined through a lengthy process with a trusted research
network. Specifically we utilized data from a collaboration between the University of Ok-
lahoma Health Sciences Center (OUHSC), the Oklahoma Department of Human Services
(OKDHS), and the North Oklahoma County Mental Health Center (NorthCare). Because
of the partnership between OUHSC, OKDHS, and NorthCare all data could be gathered
and merged into a single data table for analyses, but establishing trust and data sharing
agreements between these kinds of agencies in many states is often difficult and tenuous
at best. Though the government and university institutions involved in the data collection
have been collaborating for over twenty years, the data sharing agreement still took months
to establish.
Similar agreements often never come to fruition because sufficient trust and legal pro-
tection cannot be forged to release potentially sensitive and identifying information to
outside institutions. Moreover, laws (e.g., the Health Insurance Portability and Account-
ability Act and the Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act) sometimes preclude data
transfers without special permissions from the individuals themselves. Even when data
sharing is mandated by funding agencies or journals, the compliance rate is typically near
zero percent; Savage and Vickers (2009) show an example using the PLoS journals. How-
ever, without gathering all the data into a single location, only aggregated summaries
would typically be possible and no relationships across variables stored in separate places
could be investigated. In particular, no statistical model could be built from data stored at
separate locations without at some point bringing all the data to the same location. Our
work shows that for a wide class of models results can be reproduced accurately without
needing to physically combine the data, providing a mechanism to allow statistical model
building across multiple separate data sources and obviating the need for many data shar-
ing agreements and dramatically reducing the amount of trust required for institutions to
collaborate.
The concept known as secure multiparty computation (SMPC) was introduced and orig-
inally termed such by Yao (1982) (see also Goldwasser (1997); Lindell and Pinkas (2009)).
Various algorithms using SMPC have been proposed in the statistical disclosure control
(SDC) literature for the purpose of statistical inference. While much of the SDC work has
focused on releasing noisy microdata sets through perturbation, suppression, or generation
of synthetic data (see Hundepool et al. (2012); Willenborg and Waal (2001); Fienberg and
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Fig 1. Data partition types, with rows for individual entries and columns for attributes.
Slavkovic´ (2011); Raghunathan, Reiter and Rubin (2003) for more on these methods), the
work based on SMPC has focused on providing accurate model estimates without shar-
ing the data and minimizing sharing of intermediate statistics. This is similiar to a secure
query, that returns only the answer, on multiple physically seperate data sets.
Partitioned data can be classified as vertically, horizontally, or complexly partitioned,
see Figure 1. Vertical partitions imply each database holds the same set of individuals but
different variables. The converse, horizontal partitions, implies common variables across
databases but different sets of individuals. Finally complex partitions imply some combi-
nation of vertical and horizontal.
Previously in the SMPC literature concerned with parameter estimation, Karr et al.
(2007); Lin and Karr (2010) proposed distributed likelihood estimation (DLE) for horizon-
tally and vertically partitioned data using secure sums and oblivious transfer, Karr et al.
(2004, 2009) proposed a secure matrix multiplication algorithm to estimate the sample
data covariance matrix without combining data, Ghosh, Reiter and Karr (2007) showed
adaptive regression splines for horizontal data, Sanil et al. (2004); Karr et al. (2005), and
Fienberg et al. (2006); Fienberg, Nardi and Slavkovic´ (2009); Nardi, Fienberg and Hall
(2012) showed secure logistic regression and log-linear models for categorical data. This is
also a large body of literature on achieving data mining or machine learning results through
SMPC, such as Vaidya and Clifton (2004) or Vaidya et al. (2008), but this literature is
concerned only with prediction not parameter estimation.
When dealing with horizontally partitioned data, the solution can often be reached easily,
but it is more tricky with vertically or complexly partitioned data. Previous work related
to ours focused on two strategies for vertical partitions, either devising secure methods to
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compute the sample covaraince matrix, Karr et al. (2009), or maximizing over parameters
in the case of logistic regression, Nardi, Fienberg and Hall (2012). In this paper we will not
compute the sample covariance in closed form but achieve it by maximum likelihood.
Commonly SMPC relies on the assumption of semi-honesty, which means that all parties
will follow the algorithm as stated and will not collude to try to uncover a third party’s
information. Sometimes termed “honest but curious”, coined by Kissner et al. (2005), it
allows that parties may use available information to try to uncover other parties’ data. An-
other assumption is that the joint answer itself is not risky, such as an estimated covariance
matrix in the case of vertically partitioned regression, see Karr et al. (2009). We also make
that assumption here, while noting that this may very well not always be the case. Fur-
ther work should consider methods to combine our algorithm with efforts to minimize any
risk of releasing model estimates, but here we focus on getting accurate estimates without
sharing data or intermediate statistics, minimizing any possible data leakage.
We present a secure algorithm to calculate the correct multivariate normal log-likelihood
for a set of parameters (mean and covariance matrix) given the partitioned data, which can
be used with standard optimization techniques to produce maximum likelihood estimates
(MLEs) of the parameters. This extends from our previous non-secure algorithm given in
Snoke, Brick and Slavkovic´ (2016), where it was shown it is possible to accurately compute
multivariate normal maximum likelihood estimates without passing any data or statistics
that allow for immediate reconstruction of the data. In this paper we go a step further
and show that by using secure multiparty computation techniques we can get accurate
estimates without sharing any true information between partitions, minimizing any possible
data leakage. From a privacy standpoint, this greatly reduces the risk of implementing this
algorithm, leaving only the risk from disclosure due to releasing final model estimates.
From the inference perspective, the multivariate normal parameter MLEs are commonly
used to estimate a variety of models, such as linear models, factor analysis, principal com-
ponents analysis (PCA), or structural equation models (SEMs). This approach provides a
more general modeling framework from previous work, which focused on specific categories
of models. Under our algorithm any analyses relying on the multivariate normal MLE can
be performed across partitioned data sources. Additionally, our algorithm naturally ex-
tends to complex partitions (see Figure 1), which we demonstrate, while previous methods
have focused on horizontal or vertical partitions solely (only offering only hints of solutions
for complex partitions). Finally, our method reduces the remaining privacy risks in the ver-
tical partition setting over previous methods to directly computed the sample covariance
matrix, and the risk under our algorithm does not increase with the number of partitions,
as is the case for some previous methods which we will discuss further in section 2.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews related prior methods and
discusses potential security or computational improvements. Section 3 covers the mechanics
of distributed likelihood estimation. Section 4 presents a detailed explanation of our secure
algorithm. Section 5 gives an analysis using real data, showing accurate results without
combining the data. Section 6 presents extended simulations to test the computation and
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accuracy of the algorithm. Section 7 gives final remarks and discussion.
2. Previous secure methods. Here we detail some of the relevant related methods
used for secure MLE and covariance modeling, and we cover some of the ways in which we
plan to improve on these methods. We focus on previous algorithms that allow for general
covariance modeling to show how we improve on them with respect to data leakage. We
do not cover specific secure methods such as linear or logistic regression, since our method
generalizes to a larger class of models. We also focus on the vertical (and by extension
complex) partition case, since MLE in the purely horizontal case has been shown to be
easily generalizable (see e.g. Karr et al. (2007)).
2.1. Sample covariance estimation by secure matrix multiplication. One of the straight-
forward applications of secure protocols with statistical quantities is an algorithm for cal-
culating the sample covariance by secure matrix multiplication. The computation of the
sample covariance in this way allows for various model estimation, most notably linear and
logistic regression as shown in Karr et al. (2009); Fienberg, Nardi and Slavkovic´ (2009);
Slavkovic, Nardi and Tibbits (2007), and it is a general estimation algorithm, similar to
our method.
Suppose we have two parties, with data X1 ∈ Rn×p1 and X2 ∈ Rn×p2 , who wish to
securely compute the off-diagonal elements of the covariance matrix XT1 X2. The following
algorithm provides such a secure computation.
Algorithm 1 Secure Matrix Multiplication
Input: X1 ∈ Rn×p1 and X2 ∈ Rn×p2 held by party 1 and 2 respectively
Output: XT1 X2
1: Party 1 generates an orthonormal matrix Z ∈ Rn×a, such that ZTi X1j = 0 ∀i, j (columns)
2: Party 1 sends Z to party 2
3: Party 2 computes W = (I − ZZT )X2 where I ∈ Rn×n is the identity matrix
4: Party 2 sends W to party 1
5: Party 1 computes XT1 W = X
T
1 (I − ZZT )X2 = XT1 X2
6: (Optional) Party 1 sends XT1 X2 to party 2
The strength of this algorithm is that it is fairly simple and easy to implement. It can
also be implemented when only two parties exists, which we will see in Section 2.2 is not
always possible. The downside to this algorithm is that there exists some data leakage, so
it is possible the parties involved can learn about the other parties’ data. Karr et al. (2009)
gives preliminary explanation of the data leakage, and Samizo (2016) provides in-depth
analysis, but simply put each party will learn a certain number of linearly independent
constraints on the other party’s data matrix (contingent on the choice of a in step 1).
Additionally, if there are more than two parties, the off-diagonal elements will need to be
computed for each pair of databases, increasing both the computational burden (O(n2))
and more importantly the data leakage, since every party will learn a certain number of
linearly independent constraints on every other parties’ data.
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2.2. Maximum likelihood estimation by secure summation and oblivious transfer. In
the case of horizontally partitioned data, Karr et al. (2007) and Lin and Karr (2010)
describe a method to get MLE estimates for general exponential family models using secure
summation. This is fairly straightforward method, and to understand it further consider
the example using the multivariate normal log-likelihood.
`(µ,Σ|Z) =
n∑
j=1
`i(µi,Σi|zi)(1)
where Z is a theoretical combined database with actual partitions Z =
(
X1 X2 X3
)T
.
We can decompose this into three parts:
`(µ,Σ|Z) =
nx1∑
i=1
`i(µ,Σ|x1i) +
nx2∑
j=1
`i(µ,Σ|x2i) +
nx3∑
i=1
`i(µ,Σ|x3i)(2)
which we will refer to as LL1, LL2, and LL3 respectively.
We can get the total sum in a secure manner by adding random noise at the beginning
and removing this noise only when all intermediate summations have been completed. This
guarantees that as long as the noise is adequately large and random, only the final sum
will be learnable to all parties. The steps of the algorithm are as follows:
Algorithm 2 Secure Summation
Input: LL1, LL2, LL3 held by party 1, 2, and 3 respectively
Output: LL1+2+3
1: Party 1 computes L˜L1 = LL1 +R where R is a large random value
2: Party 2 receives L˜L1 and computes L˜L1+2 = L˜L1 + LL2
3: Party 3 receives L˜L1+2 and computes L˜L1+2+3 = L˜L1+2 + LL3
4: Party 1 receives L˜L1+2+3 and computes LL1+2+3 = L˜L1+2+3 −R
5: Party 1 shares LL1+2+3 with 2 and 3
This routine also allows for a clear understanding of collusion. If party 1 were to collude
with party 3, they could send L˜L1 to party 3. This would allow party 3 to learn LL2,
disclosing party 2’s information at no cost to parties 1 or 3. Thus in this horizontal setting
with secure summation, we must assume no collusion to ensure security, as well as assuming
at least three parties.
For vertically partitioned data, Lin and Karr (2010) offer a method to get MLE estimates
for the general exponential family. The steps are replicated below:
This method is nice because it generalizes to the exponential family, but it is not as
strong from a risk standpoint. In the first step, in the oblivious transfer, B has a 1/s
chance of correctly guessing X1i , so s must be sufficiently high, which can be computation-
ally difficult. Additionally, in the case of the multivariate normal log-likelihood function
t(Xi) = (XiX
2
i ), each party learns the sum of the other party’s data, which could be highly
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Algorithm 3 Exponential family likelihood by oblivious transfer
Input: Data matrices X1, X2 held by parties 1 and 2 respectively
Output: θˆ = argmax
θ
a(θ)T Σni=1t(Xi)− nc(θ).
1: Party 1 generates a vector W of length s, one component of which is X1i , and the other s− 1 of which
are random, and sends it to party 2
2: Party 2 computes t(W1, X
2
i )...t(Ws, X
2
i ), generates a random value i, and calculates t(W1, X
2
i ) −
i...t(Ws, X
2
i )− i
3: Party 1 obtains t(X1i , X
2
i )− i from these using 1 out of s oblivious transfer (Di Crescenzo, Malkin and
Ostrovsky (2000))
4: Party 1 holds Σi[t(X
1
i , X
2
i )− i] and party 2 holds Σii, which add to Σni=1t(X1i , X2i )
disclosive in certain situations. Disclosure from sharing of aggregated statistics has long
been researched at places such at the Census Bureau, where the concern primarily stemmed
from outliers, see Sullivan (1992). More recently many works stemming from the computer
science literature have shown there are significant risks, particularly in the case of high
dimensional data and in the presence of other external sources, e.g. see Dinur and Nissim
(2003); Homer et al. (2008); Calandrino et al. (2011). Such cases, in part have motivated
rise of differential privacy (DP), a formal framework for defining the worst-case risk, for
review see Dwork (2008). The DP itself is beyond the scope of this paper, but in Section 7,
we address a potential interplay of DP with our proposed method.
3. Distributed likelihood estimation. Distributed likelihood estimation (DLE) refers
generally to the concept of calculating a likelihood for estimation purposes, i.e. using max-
imum likelihood, in separate pieces and combining the resulting likelihoods to get a total
value. We will refer to it here specifically in the context of partitioned data, such that like-
lihoods must be calculated at separate databases and combined to get estimates because
the data cannot be physically combined. Furthermore, we focus on the situation where
maximum likelihood is achieved through an optimization routine, such as gradient descent,
and a central party exists who controls no data but facilitates the optimization. The role
of this node will be to choose initial parameters, intermediate parameters, and ultimately
convergence criterion. The central node does not control any data, but it is possible they
are the most interested in the estimates. This can be imagined as a research node where
users can request models and receive estimates. Note that this does not mean the central
party is a trusted party, as has been implemented by de Montjoye et al. (2014) or Gaye
et al. (2014). The central node, along with the data nodes, does not learn any true data
or intermediate statistics from the other nodes which is a typical case with a trusted third
party.
A strength of our setup is that having a central party allows us to utilize secure summa-
tion technologies with only two data-holding parties, since there are still three total parties.
This central party also enables the practicality of our algorithm. Previous methods have
either utilized a trusted central party to facilitate an implementation of their algorithm,
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or they have only addressed a practical implementation in general terms. For example,
the secure matrix multiplication or secure summation methods given in section 2 do not
specifically address the question of the original of the research interest or model choice.
Our central party is not trusted but is responsible for facilitating the model choice and
optimization.
3.1. Modeling by multivariate normal MLE. We focus on the multivariate normal MLE,
a well-known and flexible modeling framework which allows for the estimation of a variety
of models such as linear models, factor models, PCA, and SEMs. Assuming a multivariate
normal distribution, the goal of MLE is to maximize the likelihood equation:
L(µ,Σ|Z) =
n∏
i=1
Li(µi,Σi|zi) =
n∏
i=1
(2pi)−
1
2
pi |Σi|− 12 e(zi−µi)Σ
−1
i (zi−µi)T(3)
for mean and covariance parameters µ ∈ Rp and Σ ∈ Rp×p given a data matrix Z ∈ Rn×p.
The log-likelihood gives a summation rather than a product across each data row, allowing
for an easy secure summation application:
`(µ,Σ|Z) =
n∑
i=1
`i(µi,Σi|zi) =
n∑
i=1
−1
2
[pi ∗ log(2 ∗ pi) + log(|Σi|) + (zi − µi)Σ−1i (zi − µi)T ]
(4)
We use the formulation that allows the parameters to vary for each data row, i.e., the full-
information likelihood (e.g., see Arbuckle, Marcoulides and Schumacker (1996)) dealing
with missing data. The log-likelihood will be calculated in separate partitions, and in the
vertical case the parameters are partitioned to only pertain to certain variables in the data
matrix (see Section 3.3 for more details). Maximizing over equation (4) gives the MLE
estimates µˆ and Σˆ. With the full data matrix, the maximum can be found in closed form,
but in our case because the data are partitioned we can find the maximum by using any
standard optimization routine.
3.2. Horiztonally distributed likelihood. Horizontally partitioned data are separated by
observations, such that each database has different sets of individuals all measured on the
same variables. The parameters are the same for each partition, so DLE requires only a
secure summation of total log-likelihoods from each partition as described in section 2.2.
If we consider the log-likelihood given in equation 5, we can separate this into different
elements based on the rows in each partitioned database. All variables are the same across
databases, so the parameters relating to the data are the same across each. This is shown
in equation 6 for a theoretical combined database Z with partitions
(
X1 X2 X3
)T
. Note
that these partitions do not need to be of equal size.
`(µ,Σ|Z) =
n∑
i=1
`i(µi,Σi|zi)(5)
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`(µ,Σ|Z) =
nx1∑
i=1
`i(µ,Σ|x1i) +
nx2∑
i=1
`i(µ,Σ|x2i) +
nx3∑
i=1
`i(µ,Σ|x3i)(6)
In this case, each node receives the full set of parameters from the central optimizer and
calculates their portion of the total log-likelihood. The results are added using a secure
summation and new parameter estimates are chosen for the next step of the optimization;
see Figure 2 for a visual depiction. In the horizontal case, as noted by Karr et al. (2007),
the form of the likelihood function does not matter, so applications are not constrained to
the multivariate normal case.
Central Optimizer
Data 
Partition 3
Data 
Partition 2
Data 
Partition 1
µ
⌃
˜LL1
˜LL2
˜LL3
R
µ
⌃
µ
⌃
Fig 2. Example of three node system using secure summation for horizontally partitioned data. Red solid
lines denote path of noisy log-likelihood, green dashed lines denote path of parameters.
3.3. Vertically distributed likelihood. Vertically partitioned data are separated by vari-
ables, with each database containing different measurements on the same set of individuals.
This implies the set of parameters differs at each partition, so as shown in Snoke, Brick
and Slavkovic´ (2016) DLE must combine log-likelihoods calculated using marginal and
conditional parameters. (Note that complex partitions can be formulated as a combination
of horizontal and vertical DLE, discussed further in section 4.3.) Equation (7) shows the
decomposition of the log-likelihood function in the vertical case where Z =
(
X1 X2 X3
)
.
imsart-aoas ver. 2014/10/16 file: draftJournalPaper_byparts_v4.tex date: July 27, 2018
10 SNOKE ET. AL
Note that these partitions do not need to be of equal size. This adds complexity because
some intermediate parameters and statistics must be calculated and shared in order to
accurately calculate the total log-likelihood. These must be shared securely, but a sim-
ple secure summation of the log-likelihoods is not possible because each partition needs
different parameters. Next, we propose how to address this problem.
`(µ,Σ|Z) =
n∑
i=1
`i(µx1 ,Σx1 |x1i) +
n∑
i=1
`i(µˆx2|x1 ,Σx2|x1 |x2i) +
n∑
i=1
`i(µˆx3|x2,x1 ,Σx3|x2,x1 |x3i)
(7)
3.3.1. Marginal and Conditional Parameters for Vertical Partitions. To calculate the
partitioned log-likelihoods, we need to calculate marginal and conditional parameters based
on µ and Σ. Subsetting the parameters as shown in equation 8 for the combined dataset,
we can write the conditional parameters as shown in Equations 10, 11, 12, and 13 These
relationships come from the well-known properties of the multivariate normal distribution
and are also known as the Schur Complement in matrix theory (e.g., see Schur (1905) and
Haynsworth (1968)).
Σ =
Σx1x1 Σx2x1 Σx3x1Σx1x2 Σx2x2 Σx3x2
Σx1x3 Σx2x3 Σx3x3
(8)
µ =
(
µx1 µx2 µx3
)
(9)
Σxkxk and Σxkxl are the model-implied marginal covariance elements for the variables in
Xk and covariances between the variables in Xk and Xl respectively. µxk are the mean
parameters for the variables in Xk.
It is important to note here that these mean and covariance parameters are not the
observed sample estimates from the data, since it would be impossible to calculate Σxkxl
across partitioned data without sharing data. They are parameters defined by our model
with values chosen at each step according to the optimization routine. The exception,
though, are the conditional mean parameters that are estimated using real data (see Equa-
tions 11 and 13), and thus are denoted with the hat notation. Based on these equations,
we can estimate a distributed log-likelihood for vertical partitions that is equivalent to the
joint log-likelihood.
Note on notation: let x+ denote all variables following x in the node sequence, i.e
x+1 = (x2, x3) (variables in node 2 and 3 for a 3-node system) and x
+
2 = (x3). In the
same way let x− denote all prior variables.
Condition x+1 on x1:
Σx+1 |x1 = Σx+1 x+1 − Σx1x+1 Σ
−1
x1x1Σx+1 x1
=
(
Σx2x2|x Σx+2 x2|x1
Σx2x+2 |x1 Σx+2 x+2 |x1
)
(10)
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µˆx+1 |x1 = µx+1 + Σx1x+1 Σ
−1
x1x1(x1 − µx1) =
(
µˆx2|x1 µˆx+2 |x1
)
(11)
Condition x+2 on x1, x2:
Σx+2 |x−3 = Σx+2 x+2 |x1 − Σx2x+2 |x1Σ
−1
x2x2|x1Σx+2 x2|x1 =
(
Σx3x3|x−3 Σx+3 x3|x−3
Σx3x+3 |x−3 Σx+3 x+3 |x−3
)
(12)
µˆx+2 |x−3 = µˆx+2 |x1 + Σx2x+2 |x1Σ
−1
x2x2|x1(x2 − µˆx2|x1) =
(
µˆx3|x−3 µˆx+3 |x−3
)
(13)
This conditioning process can be repeated for as many partitions as necessary.
4. Secure algorithm for vertically partitioned data. Here we describe in more
detail our proposed algorithm for secure multiparty log-likelihood estimation with for ver-
tically partitioned data, that easily extends to complex partitions.
4.1. Notation. The following terms used in the algorithm and their corresponding equa-
tions are, for nodes k ∈ 1, ...,K with data (X1 X2 ... XK) with dimensions (n×p1), (n×
p2), ..., (n× pK).
• Pk, Rk, Qk, Mk random noise matrices with dimensions (n × pk), (n × pk), (pk ×
n), (n× pk) respectively
• A1k = Σ−1xkxk|x−k (xk − µ˜xk|x−k +Rk)
• A2k = Σ−1xkxk|x−k (xk − µ˜xk|x−k −Rk) +Qk
• Bk = µ˜x+k |x−k + Σxkx+k |x−k A
1
k
• Ck = Σxkx+k |x−k (Σxkxk|x−k )
−1
• µ˜x+k |x−k+1 =
(
µ˜xk+1|x−k+1 µ˜xk+2|x−k+1 ... µ˜xK |x−k+1
)
= Bk −Mk − Ck(Rk − Pk)
The + and − notation denote all variables in partitions following or preceeding a node,
e.g. µx+1 |x−2 denotes the conditional mean parameters for all variables in node 2 and fol-
lowing, conditional on all variables in node 1. The ∼ and ∗ notation denote noisy versions
of the true statistics. There are two noise notations, since the same statistics will have
multiple stages of noise addition or removal.
4.2. Adaptation from non-secure algorithm. From Snoke, Brick and Slavkovic´ (2016),
Algorithm 12 (shown in appendix 9) gives a method for estimating the joint likelihood
without sharing any data, but does not provide that nothing can be learned from the
statistics which are passed.
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There are four elements that we need to be computed and shared in this original algo-
rithm order to obtain correct parameter estimates that we consider to be risky. Two are
statistics of the data and two converge to statistics (recall that we use optimization to find
maximum likelihood estimates of Σ and µ). For each node k they are:
1. Σxkxk|x−k
2. µˆxk|x−k
3. Σxkx+k |x−k
4. LLk
We handle these elements as follows. First, rather than the central node sending Σ and
µ to the first data node and each node calculating the following conditional covariance pa-
rameters, the central node will calculate Σxkxk|x−k for each node k. These will be distributed
only to each node with the corresponding variables, so nodes will not learn the covariance
parameters for other nodes’ variables.
Secondly, as mentioned the central node no longer sends µ to the first node for each
node to do the conditioning. The true conditional means are risky even for data nodes
containing the corresponding variables to see because they are statistics that depend on
the previous nodes’ data. To protect this information, we both add noise to µ, and because
the conditional means are calculated using unshareable information contained by data
nodes and the central node, we must calculate them in parts and combine the pieces in
such a way that true values are not recoverable.
Next, we protect the off-diagonal covariance elements by not passing them unless com-
bined with other terms which cannot be differenced out. Though the off-diagonal elements
are not statistics, it is possible through the iteration of the optimization routine that a
partition could learn how another partition’s data covariance with their own data. Since
their own data is known, they may disclose information about the other partition’s data.
Lastly we share noisy log-likelihood totals instead of the true values, since these are
statistics of data. There are two noise components to the log-likelihood. First, by adding
noise to the mean parameters this introduces noise into the log-likelihoods. Second, we
multiply by another noise factor that lets us difference out the noise but only at the final
step.
We can think of the secure algorithm as having two primary functions, one being a
secure summation of log-likelihoods across partitions, and the second being multi-party
computation of the conditional mean parameters for each node. Vitally, the solution to
these goals work together both in obscuring the true values and in removing the noise by
the end in order to obtain the correct joint likelihood value.
4.3. Algorithm walk-through. Algorithm 4 gives the complete K data partition secure
process for calculating the total log-likelihood across vertical partitions. There are a number
of internal algorithms referenced, given in appendix 8 and named as shown. We will refer
to them by number in the following description of the algorithm.
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Algorithm 4 Secure Multiparty Log-Likelihood Estimation for Vertical Partitions
Input: µ ∈ Rp,Σ ∈ Rp×p (cental node), Xk ∈ Rn×pk ∀k ∈ K (data nodes)
Output: LLΣKj=1j
1: CN compute: CN Initiate(µ,Σ)
2: CN → DN1: Σx1x1 , µ˜x1 , PK
3: DN1 compute: EN Compute(µ˜x1 ,Σx1x1 , X1, ∅)
4: DN1 → CN: A11, A21
5: DN1 → DN2: L˜L1, R1, Q1
6: for k in 2,..., K do
7: CN compute: CN Adjust(A1k−1, µ˜x+
k−1|x
−
k−1
,Σ
xk−1xk−1|x−k−1
)
8: CN → DNk: Σxkxk|x−k , Bk−1, Ck−1, Pk−1
9: DNk compute: EN Adjust(Bk−1, Ck−1, Rk−1, Pk−1, Qk−1, L˜LΣk−1j=1 j
,Mk−1)
10: DNk compute: EN Compute(µ˜xk|x−k
,Σ
xkxk|x−k
, Xk, L˜L
∗
Σk−1j=1 j
)
11: DNk → CN: A1k, A2k
12: if k != K then
13: DNk → CN: µ˜∗x+
k
|x−
k
14: DNk → DNk+1: L˜LΣkj=1j , Rk, Qk,Mk
15: end if
16: end for
17: DNK → DN1: L˜LΣkj=1j , Qk
18: DN1 compute: FN Adjust(L˜LΣKj=1j
, Pk, Qk)
19: DN1 → CN: L˜L∗ΣKj=1j
20: CN compute: CN Final(L˜L∗
ΣKj=1j
, Pk, A
1
k, A
2
k,Σxkxk|x−k
∀k ∈ K)
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This algorithm represents one step in an optimization routine, returning the total log-
likelihood value for a given set of parameters which will then be used to choose new
values under convergence. The inputs are parameters, µ and Σ, according to an assumed
multivariate normal distribution. The output is a single value, the sum of log-likelihoods
across the entire set of partitioned databases.
In the initial step of the algorithm the central node, which runs the optimization and has
no data, partitions the parameters corresponding to the variables present at each data node.
It produces the marginal and conditional covariance matricies for each partition, which it
can do without any information from the data nodes. It also calculates the marginal mean
vectors for each node, adding noise to them:
µ˜ =
(
µ˜x1 µ˜x2 ... µ˜xK
)
=
(
µx1 + P1 µx2 + P2 ... µxK + PK
)
(14)
and saving the noise vectors. It passes on to the first data node the marginal parameters
for that node as well as the noise vector which was added to the part of the mean vector
pertaining to the K-nodes variables. This will be used in a later step in de-noising.
The first data node uses the covariance and noisy mean parameters to calculate a noisy
version of the total of the log-likelihood for its data using the following formula:
L˜L1 = Σ
n
i=1[p1log(2pi) + log(|Σx1x1 |) + (x1i − µ˜x1 +R1)Σ−1x1x1(x1i − µ˜x1 −R1)T +RT1 Σ−1x1x1R1]
(15)
with the Rk random noise vectors generated at the node level. See Algorithm 7 for more.
This different formula allows the log-likelihood to be calculated with noise that will enable
it to be passed securely to other data nodes without revealing the true value, but it is a
noise which can be recorded and removed partially at each node and partially at the final
step. We can rewrite it as:
L˜L1 = LL1 −A11P T1 − P1(A21)T − P1Σ−1x1x1P T1︸ ︷︷ ︸
noise to be removed by central node
+ P1Q1︸ ︷︷ ︸
noise to be removed by next data node
(16)
where there are two noise elements that keep the true values from being revealed. One
term will be removed by the following data node, since it cannot be known by the central
node. The other terms are removed only at the final step by the central node and serve
to keep the following data nodes from revealing the true value. Since the running total is
only passed back to the central node at the final step, when it removes all the noise it only
learns a single number, the true total log-likelihood across all the data.
This noisy formulation serves a second purpose of calculating the conditional mean
parameter, namely through A1k. As mentioned previously, the conditional mean parameters
are statistics, depending on information at both the data node and central node levels, so
they must be calculated securely in multiple stages. Because they contains noise generated
at the node level, the data nodes can pass A1k and A
2
k back to the central node which
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both facilitates the computation of the conditional mean parameter as well as the eventual
de-noising of the log-likelihood.
After performing these computations, the first data node passes the objects discussed
back to the central node, and they also pass along the noisy log-likelihood and noise vectors
they generated to the next data node. The noisy log-likelihood needs to be passed along
to each data node with each noisy total being added before returning to the central node
for final de-noising, as in the process of secure summation. The noise vectors passed to
the second data node, R1 and Q1, are used both for intermediate de-noising of the log-
likeihood, removing noise which cannot be computed by the central node, and in finishing
the calculation of the conditional mean parameter. See Algorithm 9 for more details.
Central Optimizer
Data 
Partition 3
Data 
Partition 2
Data 
Partition 1
A11
A21
A22
A12
R1 R2Q1
Q2
˜LL1
˜LL1+2
M2
P1
C1
B1
⌃22|1
µ˜⇤2+|1
A13
A23
Q3
P2
C2
B2
⌃33|2 
L˜L⌃3i=1
L˜L⇤⌃3i=1
⌃11
P3
µ˜1
Fig 3. Example three node secure algorithm visual following Algorithm 4. Red solid lines denote path of
noisy log-likelihood, green dashed lines denote path of parameters.
Before moving on to the second data node, the central node needs to make the next step
in computing the conditional mean parameter. This combines information received from
the previous data node with information controlled by the central node, computing
B1 = µ˜x+1
+ Σx1x+1
A11.(17)
See Algorithm 8 for more details. This is passed on to the next data node.
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The second data node performs finalizes the computation of the conditional mean pa-
rameter, producing a parameter which is noisy in the same way the original marginal mean
parameter (µ˜x1) was noisy.
µ˜x+1 |x1 = B1 − C1(R1 − P1) = µx+1 |x1 + P1+(18)
From here the steps start to repeat and look identical at each node. There is one additional
wrinkle, as can be seen in Algorithm 9, that from data node two onwards the conditional
mean parameters corresponding to the nodes in the following partitions must be passed
back to the central node, since the conditioning must stack. Because the central node
knows the noise added this parameter, it would be disclosive to return it to the central
node. Additional noise Mk is added to prevent this. This noise matrix is also passed along
to the next node, so it can be removed in the final step of computing the next conditional
mean parameter.
After all the nodes have completed the process of obtaining parameters and calculating
noisy log-likelihoods, the total sum is passed back to the first node, not the central node,
where it undergoes one final de-noising, see Algorithm 10. This is the same intermediate de-
noising that occurs at each data node, and it must occur at the first node before returning to
the final node. Finally, the central node receives the noisy value, and knowing all the noise
that has accumulated throughout the process is able to remove it and obtain the correct
total value, see Algorithm 11. Figure 3 gives a visual representation of the algorithm for a
three node system, with the solid red lines denoting the flow of the noisy log-likelihood and
the dashed green lines denoting the steps in computing the conditional mean parameters.
Fig 4. Splitting complex partitions into vertical subroutines
A simple extension exists for complex partitions by subsetting the routines in horizontally
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distinct vertical routines and then summing all values at the end. Figure 4 gives a visual
depiction of this process. As mentioned earlier, this requires an assumption that the central
node knows how the partitions are complexly divided and can appropriately divide the
algorithm into subroutines. Each subroutine yields a total log-likelihood value as if it were
a pure vertical partition, and each total from all subroutines are added to get the total
across all partitions. In the following section we present a real data example, with a complex
partition, as a proof of concept for our methods.
5. Real Data Example. Motivating this paper, we produce model estimates utilizing
data collected over four years (2012 - 2015) from multiple sources gathered by a trusted
research network between the University of Oklahoma Health Sciences Center (OUHSC),
the Oklahoma Department of Human Services (OKDHS), and the North Oklahoma County
Mental Health Center (NorthCare). Specifically we examined a study aimed at improving
the stability of foster care placements when the foster caregiver was a relative or person
known to the family of the child. These are so-call kinship foster placements. In the collab-
oration families with kinship foster placements were randomized to receive (a) services as
usual through OKDHS or (b) OKDHS services and additional services termed Family KIN-
nections from a community resource specialist (CRS) associated with NorthCare. OUHSC
conducted the randomization and OUHSC data collectors gathered baseline data on fami-
lies randomized to services as usual; however, to aid in subsequent service administration
the CRS gathered baseline data for families receiving Famility KINnections. Research is
ongoing, but initial work has shown the program reduced the time for a foster family to
become certified and increased the stability of a placement by roughly a factor of two.
Hecht, Hunter and Beasley (2016).
As initially collected, the baseline data (wave 1) were horizontally partitioned. Waves
2 through 7 of data collection were conducted by an OUHSC data collector for both ran-
domization groups, but these later waves were stored in a separate database from the all
baseline data, giving us a total of three databases with a complex partition (combination
of horizontal and vertical). For the application here we model only the Family Needs Scale
(FNS) Dunst, Trivette and Deal (1988). The FNS measures a family’s needs for different
resources and support with 41 items such as the extent to which the family has a need
for “Having money to pay the bills” or “Getting clothes”. The items are scored from 1
(“Almost Never”) to 5 (“Almost Always”) with higher scores indicating more need.
Table 1 shows the parameter estimates for a simple latent growth curve modeling FNS
over time with intercept and slope factors and a common residual error among the observed
variables. Latent growth models (LGMs) are a way to model a longitudinal trajectory
within the SEM framework, see Meredith and Tisak (1990). Algebraically we write the
model as:
FNSij = intercepti + λj ∗ slopei + ei(19)
where i denotes the observation and j denotes the wave. intercept and slope denote the
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Table 1
Simple Latent Growth Curve Model with three estimation methods and three imputation methods. Standard
errors given in parenthesis.
Parameter Partitioned Non-partitioned OpenMx
σˆintercept 0.4468 (0.0236) 0.4470 (0.0236) 0.4470 (0.0256)
σˆintr slp 0.0000 (NA) 0.0000 (NA) 0.0000 (0.0104)
Marginal σˆslope 0.0460 (0.0063) 0.0462 (0.0063) 0.0462 (0.0065)
Imputation σˆe 0.3658 (0.0074) 0.3646 (0.0074) 0.3646 (0.0077)
µˆintercept 2.0230 (0.0318) 2.0722 (0.0327) 2.0722 (0.0327)
µˆslope -0.0809 (0.0059) -0.0750 (0.0053) -0.0750 (0.0053)
σˆintercept 0.5173 (0.0285) 0.5183 (0.0285) 0.5184 (0.0294)
σˆintr slp 0.0000 (NA) 0.0000 (NA) 0.0000 (0.0062)
Joint σˆslope 0.0701 (0.0064) 0.0704 (0.0064) 0.0704 (0.0082)
Imputation σˆe 0.3608 (0.0079) 0.3594 (0.0078) 0.3594 (0.0079)
µˆintercept 2.0963 (0.0359) 2.1585 (0.0367) 2.1585 (0.0367)
µˆslope -0.1050 (0.0069) -0.0978 (0.0063) -0.0978 (0.0063)
σˆintercept 0.5941 (0.0421)
σˆintr slp 0.0000 (0.0191)
Full Information σˆslope 0.0456 (0.0270)
Maximum Likelihood σˆe 0.4365 (0.0179)
µˆintercept 2.1097 (0.0483)
µˆslope -0.0697 (0.0129)
latent factors, and λj ’s are fixed at {0, 1, ..., j − 1}. We are interested in estimating the
covariance matrix for the latent factors (3 parameters), the residual error for the observed
variables (1 parameter), and the factor means (2 parameters). We assume here the residual
error term is fixed across waves and the observed data has mean zero.
We fit the models in three ways to compare parameter estimates. The first is with the
secure algorithm across the three partitions. The data was partitioned as follows: the first
partition held roughly two thirds (158 out of 244) of the observations for the first wave of
FNS, the second partition held the other subset of the first wave, and the third partition
held all observations for waves 2-7. This gave the data a complex partition, similar to
that depicted in Figure 4. The second estimation method was with all data combined
using the same optimizer (the optimx() Nash and Varadhan (2011) function in R) that the
secure algorithm uses, and the third method again used a combined dataset but using the
OpenMx Neale et al. (2016) package in R R Core Team (2017) which utilizes a different
optimizer. The purpose of having both these methods was to compare our algorithm to
both a non-partitioned version of our algorithm and standard software.
In addition to the different methods of estimation, we employed three different ap-
proaches to handle missing data. As with most real data problems, missingess is an issue,
and currently our algorithm only works for complete data. For the secure algorithm to
work with missingess, some parties would need to know the missing data pattern of other
parties, which we believe constitutes too much of a privacy risk. Future work should con-
sider ways, if any, to get around this issue. To handle the missingness in the real data, we
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employed imputation as is commonly done in behavioral and social science research, see
Schafer (1997). The first method, marginal imputation, reflects the type of imputation that
would need to be done if the data were partitioned, since joint imputation requires all the
data. For comparison we also employed joint imputation and full-information maximum
likelihood (FIML), a method that subsets the mean and covariance when calculating the
log-likelihood in order to calculate the total log-likelihood without imputing or performing
listwise deletion. Note that only the OpenMx software is capable of performing the FIML
approach since this keeps the missing data. Future work could also consider a type of E-M
approach that combines our secure estimation with a joint imputation in order to per-
form joint imputation while preserving the data partitions. This extension should follow
naturally and would likely improve estimates over the marginal imputation approach.
We see in table 1 that for a given imputation method, the parameter estimates and
standard errors for the different estimation methods are very similar, generally identical
up to two decimal places, and for inferential purposes they are equivalent. This follows from
the theory that the estimates should be the same for the partitioned and non-partitioned
methods. We do see larger differences across the different imputation methods, particularly
FIML versus the imputation methods, which is understandable given the real data has a de-
cent amount of missingness to impute. Sixty-three percent of all data were missing, varying
from 28% at the initial wave to 84% at the final wave. In terms of inference, the differences
from the imputation method far outweigh any differences from using a partitioned versus
non-partitioned estimation procedure. On one hand, we show our method produces equiv-
alent values using partitioned estimation versus non-partitioned estimation, but we must
use imputation. This means our inference is limited to the estimation based on complete
data models. Additionally, only marginal imputation is currently possible, since the data
cannot be shared for joint imputation. Further work could consider developing either an
E-M approach or a FIML apporach in the partitioned setting to improve estimation when
missing data exists. In the following section we ran further simulations without missing
data to assess the general numerical accuracy of parameters estimated using the secure
algorithm.
6. Simulations for Accuracy and Computational Complexity. We ran simula-
tions (available along with the algorithm at https://github.com/jsnoke/Firewall) to
test the computational complexity of the algorithm as the number of observations, vari-
ables, and partitions increase. We expect the algorithm to scale normally with respect to
variables and observations, and we are interested to see the results as the number of nodes
increase. In one respect, the run time will slow because the number of total computations
is increasing, but as each node holds fewer variables the covariance inversions will shrink,
reducing run time. As we see from figure 5, this tradeoff does exist. When we vary number
of observations, each line for a different number of nodes shows the same slope, but shifted
from one another. In the case of varying number of variables, again each line shows the
same curve, but the optimal point is in a different place due to the relationship between p
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and k. When we look at fixed p and n, we again see an optimal number of nodes (k = 10)
for p = 25 and then a uptick after that.
We also tested the accuracy of the estimates compared to standard software for non-
partitioned estimates. Theoretically these should be the identical, but we were curious to
investigate possible numerical differences in the actual computation. We see that overall
there is less than 0.01 error, which is less than 1% error for the scale of the parameters.
Recall that theoretically there is no difference between the maximum likelihood estimates
from the partitioned or non-partitioned algorithms, so these differences occur due to nu-
merical precision. For practical purposes, the secure partitioned algorithm would produce
equivalent results as was exhibited in the real data example.
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Fig 5. Simulations for varying numbers of variables (p), observations (n), and nodes (k)
7. Discussion. The method presented in this paper represents a new alternative to
the current methods for paritioned model estimation. It extends previous work by general-
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izing the method to any type of covariance modeling, strengthens the privacy guarantees,
particularly for increasing numbers of partitions, and allows horiztonal, vertical, or com-
plex partitions within the same algorithm. These theoretical results were confirmed with a
real data example, and the accuracy was further tested through simulations.
For practical purposes, the algorithm presented here provides a solution for partitioned
estimation when researchers are interested in covariance modeling under a multivariate
normal assumption and it guarantees no sharing of data or intermediate statistics for two
or data parties. Some practical issues still exist, such as the need to impute missingness
marginally and the general complexity of the algorithm, but these are details which can
and should be further tuned in future work. The algorithm contains a fair level of com-
plexity, with numerous steps needed to obtain the correct values without sharing any true
information. It may be possible in future work to simplify the algorithm, potentially mak-
ing it easier to understand or save on computation time. By giving detailed algorithms
and making the code easily accessible we hope to facilitate any future implementations or
improvements of this methodology.
As a final remark, there has been a move in the privacy literature towards formal privacy
methods, such as Differential Privacy. While this work guarantees security under a different
definition, we believe it future work should look for ways to combine the methods here
with formal protections such as offered by perturbations of the output statistics. In some
applications it may be the case that revealing the true estimated model (or mean and
covariance matrix) constitutes a violation of privacy. For problems where that is not the
case, the algorithm presented here provides a strong guarantee of security that multiple
parties can engage in partitioned estimation with only the final model values being shared.
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8. Appendix: Internal algorithms. Reference Notation:
• Pk, Rk, Qk, Mk random noise matrices with dimensions Rn×pk ,Rn×pk ,Rpk×n,Rn×pk
respectively
• A1k = Σ−1xkxk|x−k (xk − µ˜xk|x−k +Rk)
• A2k = Σ−1xkxk|x−k (xk − µ˜xk|x−k −Rk) +Qk
• Bk = µ˜x+k |x−k + Σxkx+k |x−k A
1
k
• Ck = Σxkx+k |x−k (Σxkxk|x−k )
−1
• µ˜x+k |x−k+1 = Bk −Mk − Ck(Rk − Pk)
Algorithm 5 Central Node Initiate (CN Initiate)
Input: µ,Σ
Output: Σ
xkxk|x−k
, Pk, µ˜xk , Ck ∀k ∈ K
1: for k in 1,..., K do
2: Compute Σ
xkxk|x−k
3: Generate random Pk ∈ Rn×pk
4: Compute µ˜xk = µxk + Pk
5: Compute Ck = Σxkx+k |x
−
k
(Σ
xkxk|x−k
)−1
6: end for
Algorithm 6 External Node Computation (EN Compute)
Input: µ˜
xk|x−k
,Σ
xkxk|x−k
, Xk, L˜L
∗
Σk−1j=1 j
Output: L˜LΣkj=1j
, A1k, A
2
k, Rk, Qk
1: Generate random Rk ∈ Rn×pk
2: Generate random Qk ∈ Rpk×n
3: Compute A1k = Σ
−1
xkxk|x−k
(Xk − µ˜xk|x−k +Rk)
4: Compute A2k = Σ
−1
xkxk|x−k
(Xk − µ˜xk|x−k −Rk) +Qk
5: Compute L˜Lk = computeNoisyLL(µ˜xk|x−k
,Σ
xkxk|x−k
, Xk, Rk)
6: if L˜L∗
Σk−1j=1 j
! = ∅ then
7: L˜LΣkj=1j
= L˜L∗
Σk−1j=1 j
+ L˜Lk
8: else
9: L˜LΣkj=1j
= L˜Lk
10: end if
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Algorithm 7 Compute Noisy LL (computeNoisyLL)
Input: µ˜
xk|x−k
,Σ
xkxk|x−k
, Xk, Rk
Output: L˜Lk
1: Compute L˜Lk = Σ
n
i=1[pklog(2pi) + log(|Σxkxk|x−k |) + (xki − µ˜xk|x−k +Rk)Σ
−1
xkxk (xki − µ˜xk|x−k −Rk)
T +
RTk Σ
−1
xkxk|x−k
Rk] = LLk −A1kPTk − Pk(A2k)T − PkΣ−1xkxkPTk + PkQk
Algorithm 8 Central Node Adjustment (CN Adjust)
Input: A1k, µ˜x+
k
|x−
k
,Σ
xkxk|x−k
Output: Bk
1: Compute Bk = µ˜x+
k
|x−
k
+ Σ
xkx
+
k
|x−
k
A1k
Algorithm 9 External Node Adjustment (EN Adjust)
Input: Bk, Ck, Rk, Pk, Qk, L˜LΣkj=1j
,Mk
Output: L˜L∗
Σkj=1j
, µ˜
x+
k
|x−
k+1
, µ˜∗
x+
k+1
|x−
k+1
,Mk+1
1: Compute L˜L∗
Σkj=1j
= L˜LΣkj=1j
− PkQTk
2: if Mk! = ∅ then
3: Compute µ˜
x+
k
|x−
k+1
= Bk −Mk − Ck(Rk − Pk)
4: else
5: Compute µ˜
x+
k
|x−
k+1
= Bk − Ck(Rk − Pk)
6: end if
7: Generate Mk+1 ∈ Rn×pk
8: Compute µ˜∗
x+
k+1
|x−
k+1
= µ˜
x+
k+1
|x−
k+1
+Mk+1
Algorithm 10 First Node Adjustment (FN Adjust)
Input: L˜LΣKj=1j
, PK , QK
Output: L˜L∗
ΣKj=1j
1: Compute L˜L∗
ΣKj=1j
= L˜LΣKj=1j
− PKQTK
Algorithm 11 Central Node Final De-Noising (CN Final)
Input: L˜L∗
ΣKj=1j
, Pk, A
1
k, A
2
k,Σxkxk|x−k
∀k ∈ K
Output: LLΣKj=1j
1: for k in 1,..., K do
2: Compute LLNoisek = Σ
n
i=1[A
1
kP
T
k + Pk(A
2
k)
T + PkΣ
−1
xkxk|x−k
PTk ]
3: end for
4: Compute LLΣKj=1j
= L˜L∗
ΣKj=1j
+ ΣKj=1LLNoisej
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Algorithm 12 Non-Secure Passing Algorithm
Input: µ,Σ (cental node), Xk ∈ Rn×pk ∀k ∈ K (data nodes)
Output: LLΣKj=1j
1: CN → DN1: Σ, µ
2: DN1 compute: Σx1x1 , µx1 , Σx+1 x
+
1 |x1
, µˆ
x+1 |x1
3: DN1 compute: LL1
4: DN1 → DN2: LL1, Σx+1 x+1 |x1 , µˆx+1 |x1
5: for k in 2,...,(K-1) do
6: DNk compute: Σxkxk|x−k
, µˆ
xk|x−k
, Σ
x+
k
x+
k
|x−
k+1
, µˆ
x+
k
|x−
k+1
7: DNk compute: LLk
8: DNk → DNk+1: LLΣkj=1j , Σx+k x+k |x−k+1 , µˆx+k |x−k+1
9: end for
10: DNK compute: ΣxKxK |x−K
, µˆ
xK |x−K
11: DNK compute: LLK
12: DNK → CN : LLΣKj=1j
9. Appendix: Non-Secure algorithm.
10. Appendix: Data leakage evaluation. We acknowledge an asymmetry among
the objects received by the different nodes. By showing that none of the nodes receive
disclosive statistics, we make this asymmetry irrelevant.
10.1. Node C.
10.1.1. Starting objects. Node C holds Σ and µ (model defined parameters not statis-
tics).
10.1.2. Received objects.
• A1k for k ∈ 1...K
• A2k for k ∈ 1...K
• µ˜∗
x+k |x−k
for k ∈ 2...K − 1
• L˜L∗
ΣKj=1j
10.1.3. Anaylsis. The central node recieves A1k and A
2
k for i ∈ 1...K, such that:
A1k = Σ
−1
xkxk|x−k
(Xk − µ˜xk|x−k +Rk) = Σ
−1
xkxk|x−k
(Xk − µxk|x−k − Pk +Rk)
A2k = Σ
−1
xkxk|x−k
(Xk − µ˜xk|x−k −Rk) +Qk = Σ
−1
xkxk|x−k
(Xk − µxk|x−k − Pk −Rk) +Qk
(20)
Clearly it is important that Xk should not be recovered, and for k > 1, µ˜xk|x−k is also risky
because it is a statistic. Importantly, the central node knows Σ−1
xkxk|x−k
and Pk, so these can
be differenced out. To protect disclosure, Rk and Qk are random noise added which the
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central node does not know. Rk protects the values in A
1
k and Qk protects from learning
Rk by differencing the two equations (both A1 and A2 are needed to calculate the correct
log-likelihood).
Next, the central node receives µ˜∗
x+k |xk−1
for k ∈ 2...K − 1 such that:
µ˜∗
x+k |x−k
= µ˜x+k |x−k +Mk = µx+k |x−k + Pk +Mk(21)
The central node knows Pk, so Mk is essential here to protect the true value of the condi-
tional mean statistic. With that, there is no way for the central node to recover it.
Lastly, the central node receives L˜L∗
ΣKj=1j
. They can remove all the noise (as we want)
to get the true total log-likelihood, LLΣKj=1j
, since this is one value composed across the
entire set of partitioned databases. As assumed, this total is not risky and is necessary to
obtain accurate estimates.
10.2. Node 1.
10.2.1. Starting objects. Node 1 holds X1
10.2.2. Received objects.
• Σx1x1
• µ˜x1
• PK
• L˜LΣKj=1j
• QK
10.2.3. Analysis. The only object received by Node 1 that is conditioned on other
nodes’ data and potentially disclosive is L˜LΣKj=1j
.
Fortunately, this value is heavily perturbed with a variety of noise that Node 1 cannot
access. Another note is that Node 1 could potentially estimate the value of P1, since
µ˜x1 = µx1 + P1 and the sample mean of Node 1’s data should converge to µx1 . Again
though, this value is non-disclosive, since there isn’t anything Node 1 can learn from having
P1.
10.3. Nodes 2 through K.
10.3.1. Starting objects. Node k holds Xk
imsart-aoas ver. 2014/10/16 file: draftJournalPaper_byparts_v4.tex date: July 27, 2018
28 SNOKE ET. AL
10.3.2. Received objects.
• Σxkxk|k−
• Bk−1
• Ck−1
• Pk−1
• L˜LΣk−1j=1 j
• Rk−1
• Qk−1
• Mk−1 (M1 = 0)
10.3.3. Analysis. There is an asymmetry among nodes, since Nodes 2 and following
receive more information than Node 1. That being said, if none of it is actually disclosive
the asymmetry is acceptable.
The first objects received that are potentially disclosive are Bk−1 and Ck−1 such that:
Bk−1 = µ˜x+k−1|x−k−1 + Σxk−1x+k−1|x−k−1A
1
k−1(22)
= µx+k−1|x−k−1 + (Pk Pk+1 ... PK) + Σxk−1x+k−1|x−k−1(Σxk−1xk−1|x−k−1)
−1(Xk−1 − µ˜xk−1|x−k−1 − Pk−1 +Rk−1)
Ck−1 = Σxk−1x+k−1|x−k−1(Σxk−1xk−1|x−k−1)
−1(23)
Node k is able to remove some of the noise, since:
Bk−1 − Ck−1(Rk−1 − Pk−1) = µ˜x+k−1 + Σxk−1x+k−1|x−k−1Σ
−1
xk−1xk−1|x−k−1
(Xk−1 − µ˜xk−1|x−k−1).
The key is that the noise (Pk Pk+1 ... PK) is still present to protect the true value of
the data and parameters. More importantly, since Node k does not know any of the other
individual components (apart from Pk−1 and Rk−1), it cannot decompose Bk−1 or Ck−1
futher.
Ck−1 is unperturbed, but two things convince us it is okay to share these. First it is a
product of two matrices, neither of which Node k knows. Second these are low risk objects.
It is possible Node k learns the scale of Node (k − 1)’s data, but for now we consider that
acceptable.
Lastly Node k receives L˜LΣk−1j=1 j
, a noisy version of the running total log-likelihood. Node
k can remove some noise based on Pk−1 and Qk−1 (which we want), but does not know
A1k−1 or A
2
k−1 and thus cannot recover the true LL value.
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